expressions, gait, vital signs, brainwave patterns and companies, particularly as it relates to terrorist 92 vocal in昀氀ections. investigations, despite broader implications to the 104 ongoing security of civilians’ data. Individuals have usually consented to the collection of data for the associated bene昀椀cial use of the service Potential for misuse will be especially problematic or product, given the wave of new and stronger data for users residing in countries with poor digital 93 protection policies in many markets. However, as rights records, inadequate regulatory protection the collection, commercialization and sharing of data frameworks, or authoritarian tendencies. Forms grows, consent in one area may reveal far more than of digital repression to quell politically motivated intended when aggregated with other data points. uprisings, such as the use of spyware to track This is known as the “mosaic effect”, which gives rise activist activities, are already driving signi昀椀cant 105 to two key privacy risks: re-identi昀椀cation and attribute human rights violations in the Middle East. 94 disclosure. Research suggests that 99.98% of US Recent reports have also highlighted potential residents could be correctly re-identi昀椀ed in any data digital rights violations in Africa stemming from set – including those that are heavily sampled and the rapid expansion of biometric programmes 95 anonymized – using 15 demographic attributes. that include voter registration, CCTV with facial Researchers have used this theory to uncover the recognition, mandatory SIM card registration and 96 106 political preferences of streaming users, match refugee registration. As more emerging markets DNA from publicly-available research databases to look towards progressing their smart city plans, the 97 randomly selected individuals, and link medical collection of sensitive citizen data could expose billing records from an open data set to individual societies to additional peril if poorly governed and 98 107 patients. protected. In consequential terms, this means that an Security concerns posed by sensitive data and its international organization may share anonymized data potential abuse are well-recognized by governments. with partner governments to support effective and Countries have adopted more widespread data ef昀椀cient crisis responses. However, when combined localization policies, tightened regulation of with other data sets, it could allow the identi昀椀cation research collaborations, and banned some foreign- and tracking of vulnerable refugees and displaced owned companies from certain markets, including persons – or compromise the location of camps telecommunications, surveillance equipment and 99 and the supply chains of critical goods. Data on mobile applications, to limit the collection and 108 race, ethnicity, sexual orientation and immigration possession of sensitive data by non-allied states. status can be legally obtained in some markets Yet, less attention is being paid to the potential for and re-identi昀椀ed to varying degrees, enabling civil overreach and abuse of this data in the name of harassment and abuse. In one such example, the national security. The slow and legal erosion of the sexual orientation of a priest was obtained through digital sovereignty of individuals can have unintended the purchase of smartphone location data and and far-reaching consequences for social control and 100 announced by a religious publication. the erosion of democracies – including, for example, by compromising freedom of the press. Data-enabled anocracies The right to privacy is not absolute; it is traded-off against government surveillance and preventative policing for the purposes of national security. However, the surveillance potential of data has meant that access to sensitive information can increasingly be obtained without due process or 101 transparency. In some cases, data protection laws that require consent effectively waive the legal protections against electronic surveillance of private 102 communications and location data. In the United States of America, data is aggregated and sold on the open market with limited regulatory restrictions, meaning enforcement agencies can purchase GPS location data without warrants or public disclosure.For example, theoretically, police could use automated licence plate data (obtained by both private- and public-sector organizations) to prosecute out-of-state abortions – leading Google to announce that it would auto-delete location 103 data for users that visit related centres. There is also increasing political and regulatory pressure to weaken encryption mechanisms adopted by private Global Risks Report 2023 44