• Resource competition – the danger of geopolitical dynamics exacerbate climate- resource autarkies: distrust drives a push induced shortages in food and water. This for self-suf昀椀ciency in high-income countries, results in a truly global, multi-resource crisis, with limiting the need for rivalry over food and water widespread socioeconomic impacts that exceed to a degree, but widening divides between those faced in other futures in both scope countries. State intervention is centred on the and scale, including famine and water scarcity resource most exposed to a concentration in refugees. Geoeconomic warfare is widespread, supply – critical metals and minerals – leading but more aggressive clashes between states to shortages, price wars and the transformation become one of the few means to ensure supply of business models across industries. Resource of basic necessities for populations. power shifts, driving the formation of new blocs as well as wedges in existing alliances between Given the nature of the polycrisis in each scenario, mineral-rich and -poor countries, while the we face various environmental and socioeconomic potential for accidental or intentional con昀氀ict upsides and downsides. The following section escalates. outlines an illustrative, but non-exhaustive set of mid- term futures to help support business leaders and • Resource control – the danger of resource policy-makers in preparing for – and preventing – the wars: alongside the weaponization of metals and progression of the crises we are facing today. minerals explored in Resource competition, BOX 1 Futures framework FIGURE 3.2FIGURE 3.2 Natural rNatural resouresource polycrisis: ce polycrisis: other climate mitigation efforts as well as more futurfutures frameworkes framework rapid adaptation. Accelerated climate actionAccelerated climate action • Slow climate action: trade-offs between environmental, social and security goals slow the prioritization of attention and resources to address climate change. By 2030, there ResourResourcece ResourResourcece Geoeconomic cooperationGeoeconomic cooperation competitioncompetition collaborationcollaboration has been insuf昀椀cient or ineffective progress ontationontation towards the adaptation support required to protect infrastructure and populations from changing climactic conditions. Paired with relatively slow efforts at mitigation, this has Geoeconomic confrGeoeconomic confrResourResourcece ResourResourcece resulted in continued damage to natural contrcontrolol constraintsconstraints ecosystems and an increasing 昀椀nancial and humanitarian impact. Slow climate actionSlow climate action In parallel, the intensity of the demand-supply gap SourSourccee in natural resources will re昀氀ect the mechanisms Global Global Risks Risks Report Report 2023.2023. by which states look to boost security in key resources. We consider the extent to which We use two global drivers – geoeconomic the evolution of Geoeconomic confrontation, confrontation and speed of climate action – highlighted in Chapter 1.2, Economic warfare, to create four futures we may face by 2030, could create conditions of scarcity, by considering considering potential implications based on the two ends of a continuum (x-axis): evolution of these risks and their interactions (Figure 3.2). • Geoeconomic cooperation: characterized by open dialogue and broadscale, but not always First, we explore the potential risks of a failure of successful, economic and trade collaboration climate-change adaptation and failure of climate between powers through relevant bilateral and mitigation efforts, described in Chapter 1.2, multilateral mechanisms and forums. Well- Climate action hiatus, and the extent to which established principles governing trade policies these failures could result in conditions of scarcity, and state aid are respected. on a continuum (y-axis): • Geoeconomic confrontation: direct and • Accelerated climate action: climate action indirect clashes between global and regional and associated funding and innovation are powers through the extensive exercise of hard prioritized. By 2030, we see persistently or soft economic, industrial and technological expanding but largely well-managed impacts of power. There is limited collaboration on global climate change, nature loss, natural disasters economic and trade issues and a breakdown and extreme weather events at a global level, or paralysis of mechanisms of cooperation, as alongside a more rapid energy transition and well as alliances. Global Risks Report 2023 59